

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

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SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 442

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0269

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - LINE FIVE PARA FOUR

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: US REP AND DEP REP HAD DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY SEPTEMBER 26 AT US INITIATIVE TO REVIEW SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF FOURTH ROUND OF MBFR TALKS.

2. US REP REVIEWED REASONS WHY IT WAS DESIRABLE TO COME TO TENTATIVE UNDERSTANDING SOON ON THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE RE-
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DUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HE POINTED OUT THIS

QUESTION WAS RIPE FOR A DECISION, WHEREAS OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE LONG TO RESOLVE.

3. RESPONSE OF SOVIET REPS WAS ORTHODOX. KHLESTOV SAID MOSCOW AUTHORITIES COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN US WERE UNWILLING TO UNDERTAKE EQUAL OBLIGATION WITH WARSAW PACT STATES. SMIRNOVSKY CLAIMED THAT PRESENT WESTERN POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET MERELY REPRESENTED CONTINUED WESTERN EFFORT TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF EASTERN SECURITY. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EAST WOULD NOT AGREE TO FIRST PHASE CONSISTING OF US AND SOVIETS ALONE. KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY INSISTED SOVIETS CONTINUED INTERESTED IN POSITIVE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND KHLESTOV URGED THAT CONTINUED EFFORTS BE MADE BY BOTH SIDES TO PRESERVE GOOD WORKING ATMOSPHERE OF NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET REPS DID NOT REPEAT NOT REFER TO THEIR FIRST STP PROPOSAL NOR DID THEY SPECIFICALLY DEAL WITH CONCRETE ASPECTS OF WESTERN PHASING SUGGESTIONS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMMITMENT BY REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE IN PHASE II. COMMENT: SOVIET POSTURE WAS AS PREDICTED FOR OPENING REMARKS AND CONTAINED NO SURPRISES, NEW ARGUMENTS OR NEW ELEMENTS. END COMMENT. END SUMMARY.

4. KHLESTOV OPENED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. HE SAID MOSCOW AUTHORITIES HAD NOTED WITH INTEREST NEWS OF US REP'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT. US REP RESPONDED THAT PRESIDENT WAS WELL INFORMED ON MBFR PROJECT AND INTERESTED IN A POSITIVE OUTCOME AS A SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF DETENTE.

5. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER USREP HAD RECEIVED NEW INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS WASHINGTON STAY. US REP SAID THAT, AS ALLIED REPS SAW THE PRESENT SITUATION, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE UP THE DISCUSSION IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS WHERE IT WAS LEFT AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND, CONTINUING THEIR EFFORT TO REACH A JOINT UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS BELIEVED THIS COULD BE DONE SOON.

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THEY SAW NO BETTER WAY TO PROCEED THAN THAT OF TACKLING INDIVIDUAL ISSUES OF TRYING TO RESOLVE THEM ONE BY ONE, STARTING WITH THE EASIEST ONE. THE ISSUE PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO TACKLE FIRST-- WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET -- WAS STILL THE RIGHT ONE TO RESOLVE FIRST. THIS ISSUE WAS COMPARATIVELY SIMPLE. ALL OTHER KEY ISSUES PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO FACE IN COMING TO A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT AND

TIME CONSUMING. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF PARTICIPANTS COULD RESOLVE THIS ISSUE FIRST, DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE.

6. US REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIES HAD MADE EAST AN IMPORTANT OFFER ON THIS SUBJECT DURING THE LAST ROUND. THE NEW ELEMENTS ALLIES HAD INTRODUCED INTO THE NEGOTIATION FORMED A WORKABLE COMPROMISE ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HE DID NOT WISH TO RECAPITULATE THE SPECIFICS OF WHAT ALLIES HAD PROPOSED. BUT ALLIES HAD OFFERED A WORKABLE METHOD OF ASSURING THAT EAST WOULD OBTAIN WHAT IT SAID IT WANTED -- NAMELY, WEST EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN ADDITION TO US REDUCTIONS.

7. US REP SAID THAT, IF PARTICIPANTS COULD REACH A TENTATIVE UNDERSTANDING NOW ON THIS ISSUE, IT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO ALL CONCERNED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE REAL RESULTS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE AND THERE WAS A PROLONGED STALEMATE, THEN PESSIMISM WOULD ARISE ON BOTH SIDES AS TO WHETHER ANY PRACTICAL PROGRESS COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THESE TALKS.

8. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS WERE STILL OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT. BUT, THE LONGER THE TALKS WENT ON WITHOUT PALPABLE PROGRESS, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES. IN THE US, THERE WERE THOSE WHO URGED REDUCTIONS IN US FORCES IN EUROPE, BUT A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WAS NOT THE ONLY WAY OF DEALING WITH THESE INTERESTS. TO KEEP ALIVE THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT, THERE HAD TO BE A DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA TALKS. THAT, IN TURN, REQUIRED A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE GIVE-AND-TAKE PRO-
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CESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN HITHERTO. TO COME DOWN TO CASES, THE WEST HAD MADE THE EAST A SIGNIFICANT OFFER ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. US REP HOPED SOVIET REPS WERE NOW IN A POSITION TO GIVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

9. KHLESTOV SAID THAT IN GENERAL HE RECOGNIZED THE VALIDITY OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED AND OF THE NEED TO GET MOVEMENT. DURING HIS MOSCOW CONSULTATION HE HAD TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE WESTERN POSITION AS SET FORTH IN VIENNA BUT HAD ENCOUNTERED SERIOUS PROBLEMS. SPEAKING FRANKLY, THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WERE NOT READY TO REDUCE AS THE EAST WAS AND WERE NOT WILLING TO UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS REGARDING A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS AND SET A TIME WHEN THEY WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THESE SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THAT ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, WITH EQUAL OBLIGATIONS AND EQUAL COMMITMENTS FOR EACH SIDE. THE SOVIETS REALIZED THAT THE US WAS WILLING TO ACT, BUT THE POSITION OF THE REMAINING WESTERN
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DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD AROUSED SUSPICIONS IN MOSCOW. MOSCOW COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THEIR MOTIVATIONS. IF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE NOT READY TO MOVE TO ASSUME EQUAL OBLIGATIONS, THE MOSCOW AUTHORITIES SAW NO REASON WHY

EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE.

10. US REP POINTED OUT THAT REDUCTIONS WERE NOT THE SAME AS WITHDRAWALS AND THAT OBLIGATIONS WERE NOT EQUAL OWING TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF THE US AND USSR AND THAT OF REMAINING PARTICIPANTS. IT WAS PERFECTLY LOGICAL FOR THE OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO EXPECT THE GREAT POWERS TO GO FIRST. ALTHOUGH THIS HAD NOT BEEN THEIR ORIGINAL INTENTION, THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD NOW CLEARLY INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE. FROM THE POLITICAL VIEWPOINT, IT WAS MANIFEST THAT A SUCCESSFUL FIRST PHASE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SUCCESSFUL SECOND PHASE. THE SOVIETS WERE IN FACT ASKING SOME PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE A GREATER OBLIGATION THAN OTHERS. THE WEST WAS TREATING ALL PARTICIPANTS WHO WERE IN THE SAME SITUATION IN THE SAME WAY. IT WAS NOT ASKING THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEANS REDUCE IN THE FIRST PHASE. IT SHOULD BE REALIZED THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD COME A LONG WAY ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE SOVIET REPS SHOULD CONTRAST THE STARTING POSITION OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITH THEIR PRESENT POSITION. THERE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. KHLESTOV SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, IT WAS JUSTIFIABLE TO EXPECT A COMMENSURATE MOVE ON THE EASTERN SIDE.

11. KHLESTOV ASSERTED THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD STARTED FROM AN OPENING BARGAINING POSITION AND HAD THEN MOVED TO DEVELOP THEIR POSITION SOMEWHAT, WHEREAS THE EASTERN POSITION HAD BEEN LOGICAL FROM THE OUTSET.

12. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A WESTERN EFFORT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATION. THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UN-SECRET

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DIMINISHED SECURITY. IT DID NOT MAINTAIN THE EXISTING MILITARY "BALANCE"(SIC) BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN CENTRAL EUROPE NOR DID IT INCLUDE AIR OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. RATHER, IT WAS AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

13. US DEPREP SAID THAT, FOR THEIR PART, THE ALLIES ASSESSED THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS AS EFFORT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE EXISTENCE OF THIS CONFRONTATION OF VIEWS ON REDUCTIONS WAS WHY THE ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED LEAVING ASIDE THE ISSUE OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE MOMENT AND FIRST DEALING

WITH THE MORE MANAGEABLE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE REDUCTION PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE. PRESUMABLY, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN MOTIVATED BY THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS IN AGREEING TO FOCUS ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES FROM THE OUTSET.

14. SMIRNOVSKY SAID WESTERN PROPOSALS ON PHASING SHOWED THAT WEST WAS STILL IN THE SAME POSITION NOW AS IT HAD BEEN AT THE BEGINNING. THE WEST WAS PROPOSING THAT TWO SHOULD REDUCE, WHILE THE EAST PROPOSED THAT ALL ELEVEN SHOULD REDUCE.

15. US DEPREP SAID THIS WAS NOT AN ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF THE SITUATION. THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT ONLY TWO SHOULD REDUCE AND THE EASTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT ELEVEN SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE WEST HAD NOW MOVED. ITS PROPOSAL WAS NOW THAT TWO SHOULD REDUCE AND THAT FIVE SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE. THE EAST HAD STUCK WITH ITS ORIGINAL POSITION THAT ALL ELEVEN SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET AND HAD NOT MOVED FROM IT.

16. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THESE REMARKS INDICATED THAT US REPS BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD BE TWO PHASES OF REDUCTION WITH US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY IN THE FIRST PHASE. THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN. US REP INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD RECONSIDER THIS ATTITUDE IF THEY WISHED MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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17. BOTH SOVIET REPS SEVERAL TIMES STATED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT WISHED CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARDS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT SOON. THEY MADE NO MENTION OF THE SOVIET FIRST STEP AGREEMENT PROPOSAL NOR DID THEY REFER TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON PHASING. IN CLOSING, KHLESTOV MADE A PLEA FOR MAINTAINING A GOOD WORKING ATMOSPHERE IN THE TALKS IN ORDER TO CHECKMATE "THOSE" (UNSPCIFIED) WHO WERE SEEKING TO WORSEN THE ATMOSPHERE. RESOR

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